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THE LITIGATION PRIVILEGE:

ITS PLACE IN CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE
Louise Lark Hill*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Historically, lawyers have been immune from civil liability for
statements related to litigation which may injure or offend an opposing
party during the litigation process.' This protection is referred to as the

"litigation

privilege,"'

which

originated

in

medieval

English

jurisprudence and continues to be recognized in the United States today.'
The rationale supporting the litigation privilege is that the integrity of
the adversary system outweighs any monetary interest of a party injured
by her adversary.' Remedies other than lawsuits are available to parties
* Professor of Law, Delaware Law School, Widener University, Wilmington, Delaware.
1. See Douglas R. Richmond, The Lawyer's Litigation Privilege, 31 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
281, 284 (2007).
2. This privilege is also referred to as the "judicial proceedings privilege," the "judicial
privilege," or the "defamation privilege." See Messina v. Krakower, 439 F.3d 755, 760 (D.C. Cin
2006); Buchanan v. Minn. State Dep't of Health, 573 N.W.2d 733, 736 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998);
Bochetto v. Gibson, 860 A.2d 67,71 (Pa. 2004).
3. See T. Leigh Anenson, Absolute Immunity from Civil Liability: Lessons for Litigation
Lawyers, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 915, 918-20 (2004). In either 1497 or 1569, the privilege was first
applied in an English case. Id. at 918-19 n.12 (citing R.C. Donnelly, History of Defamation, 1949
Wis. L. REv. 99, 109 & n.48) (dating the first case applying the privilege as a 1497 case); cf 8
WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 376 (1925) (dating the same case as a
1569 case). However, the first case in which a lawsuit was dismissed against a lawyer by
application of the privilege was in 1606. Anenson, supra, at 919. In that case, a lawyer was accused
of slander when, during trial, he asserted that his client's adversary was a convicted felon. Brook v,
Montague (1605) 79 Eng. Rep. 77, 77 (KB). The court determined that even if the lawyer's
statement was false, his attempt to discredit a witness was protected by absolute immunity. Id.
4. See Thomas Borton, Comment, The Extent of the Lawyer's Litigation Privilege, 25 J.
LEGAL PROF. 119, 121 (2001). Policy considerations behind the litigation privilege include:
(1) promoting the candid, objective and undistorted disclosure of evidence; (2) placing
the burden of testing the evidence upon the litigants during trial; (3) avoiding the chilling
effect resulting from the threat of subsequent litigation; (4) reinforcing the finality of
judgments; (5) limiting collateral attacks upon judgments; (6) promoting zealous
advocacy; (7) discouraging abusive litigation practices; and (8) encouraging settlement.
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who feel they have been damaged "by malicious statements or conduct
during litigation."s For instance, misconduct in a judicial proceeding can
be addressed through procedural rules or a court's contempt power, as
well as the disciplinary abilities of court systems and bar associations.'
Often used in response to defamation claims, the privilege
has been noted to be "the backbone to an effective and smoothly
operating judicial system."' Eradicating the privilege "would dissuade
attorneys from zealously representing their clients and might reduce
access to the courts." 9
This Article will address the litigation privilege as it currently exists
and examine several relevant contemporary cases. Cases in which the
litigation privilege was successfully raised will be addressed, as well as
one case in which a lawyer, rather than pursue the litigation privilege,
chose to use a lack of duty defense. The latter case will be reviewed
from the perspective of the litigation privilege, and this Article will
propose that if the litigation privilege had been used, the outcome may
have been different. While extolling that the use of the privilege is an
important protection for lawyers, the reader will be reminded
of its limits. The reader will also be reminded of the need for
lawyers to be vigilant in the practice of law and mindful of concomitant
duties and responsibilities.
II.

COMPONENTS OF THE LITIGATION PRIVILEGE

There are two categories of communications privileges. They are
either absolute or conditional (qualified)."o The primary distinction
between the two is that the absolute privilege confers immunity
regardless of motive, whereas conditional privileges are defeated if they
Clark v. Druckman, 624 S.E.2d 864, 870 (W. Va. 2005) (citations omitted); Lance J. Schuster,
Taylor v. McNichols: Expanding the Litigation Privilege, ADVOCATE, Feb. 2011, at 38, 39 ("A
lawyer should not be worried about being sued for the motions she files, the allegations she makes,
or the questions she asks in a deposition or at trial.").
5. Oran F. Whiting, Litigation Privilege Immunizes Lawyers from FraudActions, ABA
(Aug. 8, 2013), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/top stories/080813-litigationprivilege.html.
6. Penalties can be imposed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as well as under
state procedural rules. These can include monetary sanctions, reprimands, orders to attend
continuing legal education classes, or suspension of one's law license. See Anenson, supranote 3, at
925-26.
7. See generally Barbara Busharis, The Florida Supreme Court Extends the Litigation
Privilege, TRIAL ADVOC. Q., Spring 2007, at 6.
8. Tuff-N-Rumble v. Sugar Hill Music Publ'g Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 673, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(quoting Peterson v. Ballard, 679 A.2d 657, 660 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996)).
9. Whiting, supra note 5.
10. See Borton, supra note 4, at 121.
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are abused-for instance, when a defendant acts maliciously.' Complete
immunity from civil action is provided for absolutely privileged
communications "even though the statements are made with malice,
because public policy favors the free and unhindered flow of
information."" The existence of absolute immunity is a question of law
to be determined by the court." With some exceptions, absolute
immunity is recognized across the United States and has little variation
from state to state.' 4 However, some jurisdictions view the litigation
privilege as an affirmative defense, while others view it as "a true
immunity."" As a true immunity, lawyers can move to dismiss an action
filed against them or move for summary judgment, and if unsuccessful,
they can typically immediately appeal.1 6 If, instead, the litigation
privilege acts as an affirmative defense, an immediate appeal is not
readily available.II
Although the litigation privilege is recognized across the United
States, there are numerous legal issues associated with its application,
and the circumstances under which it applies are not consistent.' 8 New
Jersey and California's recitations of the litigation privilege "are
representative of the conceptions of most jurisdictions."" They provide
11. Id.
12. Bushell v. Caterpillar, Inc., 683 N.E.2d 1286, 1287 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). The privilege's
absolute bar to civil actions "reflects a determination that the potential harm to an individual is far
outweighed by the need to encourage participants in litigation, parties, attorneys, and witnesses to
speak freely in the course of judicial proceedings." McGranahan v. Dahar, 408 A.2d 121, 124 (N.H.
1979). If those precluded from bringing defamation claims could recover under other liability
theories, this "policy would be nullified." Hugel v. Milberg, 175 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 1999).
13. See Anenson, supra note 3, at 918 n.11.
14. Id. at 917. Louisiana private lawyers do not have absolute immunity, but Louisiana
prosecutors do. See Richmond, supra note 1, at 285. Georgia lawyers only have absolute immunity
for statements made in pleadings, but are otherwise only granted qualified immunity, as are lawyers
in Louisiana. See Anenson, supra note 3, at 917 n.6.
15. Richmond, supra note 1, at 285; see also Borton, supra note 4, at 124 ("The absolute
litigation privilege is 'most often used as a defense' to civil claims brought against an
attorney. ... However, a substantial number of jurisdictions hold that the privilege provides an
absolute immunity from suit altogether." (quoting Memorial Drive Consultants, Inc. v. ONY, Inc.,
No. 96-CV-0702E(F), 1997 WL 584315, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1997))). It is projected that the
litigation privilege is used more as a defense than as a complete immunity from suit because the
Restatement (Second) of Torts places it in chapter 25, entitled "Defenses to Actions for
Defamation." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 25 (AM. LAW INST. 1976); see also Anenson,
supranote 3, at 947 n.234.
16. See Richmond, supra note 1, at 286. Under the collateral order doctrine, certain orders
"may be immediately appealed as final even though they do not end the related litigation." Id. at 286
n.34. However, since application of the doctrine is a matter of law, resolution of its applicability
may be slow, turning on factual matters and requiring discovery. Id. at 287.
17. Id. at 286.
18. See Anenson, supranote 3, at 927.
19. Borton, supra note 4, at 122.
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that "[t]he absolute privilege applies to 'any communication (1)
made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or
other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects
of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical
relation to the action."' 2o However, questions surround the scope of each
of these elements.2 1
A.

Applicable Claims

While the litigation privilege originated to protect lawyers from
suits for defamation and libel, over time, the immunity it provides has
been extended to cover other claims, as well. 2 2 Therefore, in determining
if the litigation privilege attaches in a particular matter, courts must
determine which claims are protected by the privilege. It has been noted
that some "courts have not hesitated to expand the privilege 'to cover
theories, actions, and circumstances never contemplated by those who
formulated the rule in medieval England."' 23 Expanding the litigation
privilege's protection beyond just defamation and libel, some courts
have given protection to causes of action brought in "negligence, breach
of confidentiality, abuse of process, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy,
civil conspiracy, interference with contractual or advantageous business
relations, fraud, and in some cases, malicious prosecution." 24 These
causes of action, which lie outside those contemplated by the rule as
originally implemented, "prevent attorneys from circumventing the
privilege by creative pleading." 25

20. Id. (quoting Hawkins v. Harris, 661 A.2d 284, 289 (N.J. 1995)). This is in line with the
approach of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides that each party to private litigation is
"absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning another in communications
preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or in the institution of or during the course and as
part of, a judicial proceeding in which he participates, if the matter has some relation to the
proceeding." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 588.

21. See Anenson, supra note 3, at 927.
22. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
23. Paul T. Hayden, Reconsidering the Litigator'sAbsolute Privilege to Defame, 54 OHIO ST.
L.J. 985, 998 (1993) (quoting RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE

§

17.8 (3d ed. 1989)).
24. Anenson, supra note 3, at 927-28 (footnotes omitted); see Whiting, supra note 5 ("[Alt
least 12 jurisdictions have abrogated the litigation privilege for claims of fraud by enacting statutes
for that purpose.").
25. Anenson, supra note 3, at 928.
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Statements and Conduct

In accordance with the initial protection from suits for defamation
and libel it provided, the litigation privilege first applied to statements
that were made during a judicial proceeding.2 6 Over time, some
jurisdictions expanded its protection to cover acts that occurred in the
course of a legal proceeding, in addition to statements.2 7 To this end, the
privilege applied to acts that were communicative. 28 Therefore, in
determining if the litigation privilege attaches in a particular matter,
courts determine if immunity applies only to statements, or also includes
conduct, and if so, the character of that conduct.29 As noted in making a
distinction between communicative and non-communicative conduct,
"the key in determining whether the privilege applies is whether the
injury allegedly resulted from an act that was communicative in its
essential nature."3 o
In addition to communicative conduct, non-communicative conduct
has also been protected. As the doctrine developed, some jurisdictions
found no difference between communications and any form of conduct,
and, therefore, extended the litigation privilege "to protect attorneys
against civil actions which arise as a result of their conduct or
communications in the representation of a client, related to a judicial
proceeding."" It has been asserted that "[i]f courts see fit to carve out
non-communicative actions or conduct from the protections of the
litigation privilege, those exceptions should be plain and the reasons
supporting them easily explained."3 2
C.

To Whom the PrivilegeAttaches

When analyzing the applicability of the litigation privilege, another
issue that must be resolved is to whom the privilege attaches. Originally
recognized to protect lawyers, many jurisdictions also use the privilege
to protect other parties and witnesses. The Restatement (Second) of Torts

26. See Schuster, supranote 4, at 38.
27. See id.
28. See Richmond, supranote 1, at 287-88. For instance, a lawyer who physically assaults an
opponent cannot use the litigation privilege as a shield from civil or criminal liability. Id at 288.
29. Id. at 287-90.
30. Rusheen v. Cohen, 128 P.3d 713, 719 (Cal. 2006) (citations omitted).
31. Schuster, supra note 4, at 38 (quoting Taylor v. McNichols, 243 P.3d 642, 652 (Idaho
2010)).
32. Richmond, supranote 1, at 289. In the Ohio case of Hahn v. Satullo, a lawyer was granted
absolute immunity for conduct involving the receipt and failure to return a file containing material
that was confidential. No. 01CV007246, 2002 WL 344530099, at *1-2 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 16,
2002).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2015

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 11

406

HOFSTRA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 44:401

recognizes an absolute privilege for private litigants, private prosecutors,
criminal defendants, and witnesses, provided the material at issue has
some relation to the proceedings." However, what about the people with
whom the lawyer works? Lawyers often work with other people, such as
investigators and legal assistants. There is authority that indicates the
agents of a lawyer are also protected by the litigation privilege, 34
provided that what they are doing is "at the attorney's request."35
Therefore, a court must determine whom the privilege protects and
whether this protection extends to the individuals with whom the lawyer
works to further a case that is the subject of a judicial proceeding.
D.

Type of Proceeding

The litigation privilege protects statements and some conduct that
occur during judicial proceedings. While originally applicable to what
would be considered "traditional litigation," courts have expanded the
reach of the privilege to judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. 6
Statements made during settlement conferences, as well as statements
made during pretrial discussions, have been protected.37 Additionally,
some courts have protected statements made during arbitration,
mediation, administrative proceedings, and professional discipline
matters." The Restatement (Second) of Torts confines the litigation
privilege to "all proceedings before an officer or other tribunal
exercising a judicial function." 9 It extends "to every step in the
proceeding, from beginning to end," including preliminary, pretrial, and
post-trial phases of litigation.4 0 Therefore, when analyzing the
applicability of the litigation privilege, courts must determine if the
33.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§§

587-88 (AM. LAW INST. 1976).

34. See Richmond, supra note 1, at 299-301.
35. Hawkins v. Harris, 661 A.2d 284, 291 (N.J. 1995) (explaining that privilege protects a
lawyer's agents and employees who assist the lawyer and act at the lawyer's direction).
36. Anenson, supra note 3, at 931.
37. See John L. Slimm, The Litigation Privilege in Claims Against Attorneys, N.J.L.J., Mar.
14, 2011, at 1, 1. However, prior to litigation, it has been asserted that for the privilege to be
applicable, a judicial proceeding must be contemplated in good faith, and the mere possibility of
litigation is not sufficient. See Richmond, supra note 1, at 304-05.
38. See Anenson, supra note 3, at 931. Some courts make a distinction between judicial and
administrative determinations for purposes of applicability of the privilege. Id at 932 & n.96.
39.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 586

cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1976).

40. Anenson, supra note 3, at 939-40. The litigation privilege extends "before, during and
after trial." Id. at 945. It has been recognized in, "inter alia, pleadings, requests for admissions,
depositions, affidavits, inspection of records under court order, grand jury testimony, expert reports,
in camera conferences attended by a judge, and pretrial conferences." Id. at 940 (footnotes omitted).
It has also been extended to informal proceedings such as "[i]nterviews with prospective or actual
witnesses, statements made at private meetings, statements made in the judge's chambers, and
conduct relating to the investigation of a claim." Id.
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proceeding in which the statement or conduct occurred would fall within
its scope. The court must discern when the reach of the litigation
privilege commences and at what point it terminates.
E. Relationship to the Litigation
To be protected, a statement or conduct must be related to the
judicial proceedings in which it is made or occurs. According to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, it must have "some" relation to the
proceeding 41-a standard considered to be "liberal."4 2 It has also been
said that "the 'privilege should only be denied if the statement is so
palpably irrelevant to the subject matter of the action that no reasonable
person can doubt its irrelevancy."'4 3 Furthermore, legal relevance is not
required." Generally, for the privilege to attach, there need only be
"some connection" between the case and the conduct,45 arguably, "only
those actions with no connection at all to the litigation are
unprivileged."46 Therefore, in determining the applicability of the
litigation privilege, a court must discern and apply the jurisdiction's
respective standard for a statement or conduct's connection or relation to
the judicial proceeding.
F. Achieving the Object of the Litigation
In determining if statements or conduct are entitled to protection
under the litigation privilege, courts examine their purpose along with
the method used to achieve that goal.47 There is no protection for "use of
legal process in an improper manner or primarily to accomplish a
purpose for which it was not designed."4 8 For instance, statements or
conduct designed to gather evidence or to further settlement of the case
are legitimate goals,49 whereas an attempt to deprive a party of the

41.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 587.

42. See Richmond, supranote 1, at 317-18.
43. Wendy L. Wilcox, Applying the Litigation Privilege Before Trial, L.A. L., June 2003, at
12, 12 (quoting Sacramento Brewing Co. v. Desmond, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 760, 765 (Ct. App. 1999)).
44. See Anenson, supra note 3, at 932-33.
45. Id. at 933.
46. Id. at 934; Borton, supra note 4, at 122 ("The English Rule provides litigants with a 'true,
absolute privilege without regard to the relevancy of the statements to the subject matter of the
proceedings' while the American rule requires that the defamatory statements possess some sort of
relation to the proceedings or pertinence to the litigation in general." (quoting Hawkins v. Harris,
661 A.2d 284, 288 (N.J. 1995))).
47. See Anenson, supra note 3, at 935.
48. Whiting, supra note 5.
49. See Anenson, supra note 3, at 935.
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counsel of her choice would not be a legitimate goal.s Nor would a
personal attack on an individual not aimed at securing a litigation
benefit." For the litigation privilege to attach, a court must find that the
statement or conduct was not used for a purpose for which the litigation
was not designed. Otherwise, the privilege "would effectively convert
what is meant to be a shield of immunity into a sword."S2
III.

SELECTED CONTEMPORARY CASES

The litigation privilege has existed for centuries and continues to be
used by lawyers as a defense to actions brought against them, typically
by adversaries.53 In 2014, numerous lawyers successfully used the
privilege as a defense, with courts being receptive to its historic
implementation. Representative of the litigation privilege's reach are the
cases of Johnson v. Johnson & Bell, Ltd.5 4 and Kimmel & Silverman,
P.C. v. Porro.s5 In both of these cases, lawyers escaped liability because
the privilege protected their conduct during the litigation process. In the
56
rather than use the litigation
case of Innes v. Marzano-Lesnevich,
privilege, the defendants in that case chose to defend on the theory that
no duty of care was owed to a client's adversary-a defense that proved
unsuccessful. It is possible that the defendants in Innes would have fared
better by asserting the litigation privilege.
A.

Johnson v. Johnson & Bell, Ltd.

In February 2014, the Illinois Appellate Court upheld the dismissal
of plaintiffs case for invasion of privacy, negligence, negligent
infliction of emotional distress, and breach of contract, in which
defendants contended that these claims were barred by the absolute
litigation privilege, res judicata, and collateral estoppel." In a prior
lawsuit, a plaintiff had filed an unsuccessful personal injury claim
against the retail store Target alleging injuries caused by a slip and fall at
50. Id at 936. Another impermissible goal, according to some courts, is using existing
litigation to achieve a business advantage for a client. See State-Wide Ins. v. Glavin, 235 N.Y.S.2d
66, 67 (App. Div. 1962).
51. See Post v. Mendel, 507 A.2d 351, 356-57 (Pa. 1986). Absolute immunity does not
protect lawyers "against claims alleging the pursuit of litigation for the unlawful, ulterior purpose of
inflicting injury on the plaintiff and enriching themselves and their client, despite knowledge that
their client's claim lacked merit." Whiting, supra note 5.
52. Anenson, supra note 3, at 936.
53. Id. at 917-19.
54. 7 N.E.3d 52 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
55. 53 F. Supp. 3d 325 (D. Mass. 2014).
56. 87 A.3d 775 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014).
57. Johnson, 7 N.E.3d at 55, 57.
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a Target store. Prior to the trial on the personal injury matter, which was
before the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
("Northern District of Illinois"), a joint, final pretrial order was entered
in the Northern District of Illinois's electronic filing system that
contained personal information about the plaintiff."
While the personal injury matter was on appeal to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ("Seventh Circuit"), the plaintiff became
aware that her personal information had been disclosed in the final
pretrial order, and she then moved for the district court to seal and redact
certain documents, and for sanctions to be imposed against Target. The
Northern District of Illinois granted the motion to seal and redact
designated documents, but denied the motion for sanctions.s" The
plaintiff then filed a substantially similar motion in the Seventh Circuit
to seal certain documents and for sanctions, which the Seventh Circuit
granted with respect to sealing the designated documents.60
The plaintiff followed with an action in the Circuit Court of Cook
County, Illinois, suing Target, the law firm representing Target, Johnson
& Bell, Ltd., and two of the firm's lawyers, Robert Burke and
Jennifer Rose. The defendants successfully raised the litigation
privilege as a defense. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that the absolute
litigation privilege did not bar her claims, but the appellate court
disagreed. 6' Outlining the reach of the privilege, the appellate court
stated the following:
An attorney is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter
concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed
judicial proceeding, or in the institution of, or during the course and as
part of, a judicial proceeding in which he participates as counsel, if it
has some relation to the proceeding. A private litigant enjoys this same
privilege concerning a proceeding to which he is a party. 62

58. Id at 54. The final pretrial order was prepared and signed by all the parties, including the
plaintiff. Id. Documents were attached to the final pretrial order that included plaintiffs social
security number, financial information, medical information, and references to a minor. Id
59. Id at 55.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 55-57. The court also found that the other defenses raised by the defendants were
well-founded. No civil cause of action exists for misconduct that occurs in prior litigation. The
proper venue for raising such claims is the venue in which the misconduct occurred. Id at 57
("Plaintiffs arguments regarding Target's counsel's alleged misconduct was heard in federal court,
which was the proper venue. . .. The fact that neither court chose to assess sanctions against Target
or its counsel does not provide an adequate basis for a civil action in state court based on the same
conduct.").
62. Id. at 56 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 586-87 (AM. LAW INST. 1976)).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2015

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 11

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

410

[Vol. 44:401

The appellate court further found that the absolute privilege applies
to any matter involving an invasion of privacy, and, as such, it was
applicable to the plaintiffs invasion of privacy claim.63 The appellate
court also found that the privilege was applicable to the plaintiffs other
claims, as well. While Illinois had not previously addressed the litigation
privilege's applicability to claims for negligent infliction of emotional
distress or breach of contract, the appellate court went along with other
courts that had found it to be applicable." Otherwise, "[t]he absolute
privilege would be meaningless if a simple recasting of the cause of
action . .. could void its effect."s This case is indicative of the

broadening reach of the litigation privilege in terms of the causes of
action to which it applies and the people and entities that it protects.
B.

Kimmel & Silverman, P.C. v. Porro

&

In September 2014, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts ("District of Massachusetts") adopted a Report and
Recommendation of a magistrate judge finding that the absolute
litigation privilege protected the defendants in an action for breach of
contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
and fraud.66 In a prior lawsuit ("Porro Lawsuit"), defendants David P.
Angueira, Esq. and the law firm of Swartz & Swartz, P.C. (collectively,
"Swartz defendants") represented the defendants Jacqueline Porro, Esq.
and Michael Porro in litigation against the plaintiffs, Kimmel
Silverman, P.C. and Craig Kimmel, Esq. (collectively, "Kimmel").67 The
Porro Lawsuit was settled pursuant to a Settlement Agreement. As part
of that Settlement Agreement, the Swartz defendants were precluded
from disclosing certain confidential information that they had obtained.68
Subsequently, the Swartz defendants represented Krista Lohr in
litigation against Kimmel ("Lohr Lawsuit"). In the Lohr Lawsuit, the
Swartz defendants filed documents that Kimmel argued contained
confidential information, which the Swartz defendants were precluded
from disclosing under the Settlement Agreement in the Porro Lawsuit.69

In the action Kimmel brought against the Swartz defendants, Kimmel
contended that their filing of the alleged confidential information, among
other things, constituted a breach of contract, breach of the implied
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Barker v. Huang, 610 A.2d 1341, 1349 (Del. 1992)).
Kimmel & Silverman, P.C. v. Porro, 53 F. Supp. 3d 325, 328-29 (D. Mass. 2014).
Id
Id. at 329.
Id.
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covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and fraud.70 The Swartz
defendants claimed that their disclosure of any alleged confidential
information in the Lohr Lawsuit was protected as a matter of law under
various theories, one of which was the absolute litigation privilege.7
In reviewing the contentions of the parties, the District of
Massachusetts was "constrained to agree" with the Swartz defendants
that none of the claims against them were actionable because of the
absolute litigation privilege.72 In addressing the scope of the absolute
litigation privilege, the court stated the following:
"Under Massachusetts law, an attorney's statements are absolutely
privileged 'where such statements are made by an attorney
engaged in his function as an attorney whether in the institution or
conduct of litigation or in conferences and other communications
preliminary to litigation.' . . . "The privilege 'is based upon a public
policy of securing to attorneys as officers of the court the utmost
freedom in their efforts to secure justice for their clients."' . . . Thus, it
"shields an attorney from civil liability for statements made in the
course of litigation." 73
The court noted that, in addition to applying to statements made in
the course of litigation, "the privilege applies to an attorney's conduct in
carrying out tasks associated with the litigation process."74 Thus, the
Swartz defendants' statements made during the Porro Lawsuit, and their
actions in filing deposition transcripts and engaging in a chain of emails
during the course of litigation in the Lohr Lawsuit, were protected from
liability under the absolute litigation privilege.75
Kimmel contended that, "[w]hile the privilege serves a specific
purpose-to secure freedom of expression for attorneys in pursuit of
their clients' interests-that purpose is subsumed here by an underlying
contractual obligation," which was the nondisclosure preclusion in the
Porro Lawsuit Settlement Agreement. 76 However, the court did not
agree. Although the issue of contractual obligation supremacy had not
been addressed in Massachusetts previously, the court held that "[c]ourts
that have addressed the question directly have ruled that the litigation
privilege does not yield to a litigant's obligations under a pre-existing

70.
71.
72.
73.
Bartle v.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id. at 329-30, 340.
Id. at 342.
Id (citations omitted) (quoting Blanchette v. Cataldo, 734 F.2d 869, 877 (1st Cir. 1984);
Berry, 953 N.E.2d 243, 249 (2011)).
Id.
Id. at 343.
Id.
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contract."" Therefore, the court concluded that "both the applicable
case law and the policy behind the absolute litigation privilege compel
the conclusion that the Swartz defendants cannot be held liable for any
such violation."78

C.

Innes v. Marzano-Lesnevich

In April 2014, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division,
upheld a $700,000 verdict in an action brought by a non-client against an
opposing party's lawyer and her law firm. 9 Madeline MarzanoLesnevich and her law firm, Lesnevich & Marzano-Lesnevich,
represented Maria Jose Carrascosa in a divorce proceeding against her
husband, Peter [nnes. Previously, Carrascosa had been represented by
Mitchell Liebowitz, at which time Innes and Carrascosa executed an
agreement containing travel restrictions for their toddler daughter,
Victoria. Innes was represented by Peter Van Aulen. The agreement
contained a provision that the U.S. and Spanish passports of Victoria,
who had dual citizenship, were to be held in trust by Liebowitz. 8 o

Carrascosa subsequently discharged Liebowitz and retained MarzanoLesnevich, who then received the case file, including Victoria's U.S.
passport, from Liebowitz.8' Marzano-Lesnevich gave Victoria's U.S.
passport to Carrascosa, and, using that passport, Victoria traveled to
Spain the next month and has remained there since.8 2 lImes successfully
77. Id.
78. Id. at 344.
79. Innes v. Marzano-Lesnevich, 87 A.3d 775, 779 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014). At trial,
a jury awarded Innes $700,000 and Victoria $250,000. Id. This $950,000 malpractice verdict against
Marzano-Lesnevich and her firm was said to "set out 'a new standard of responsibility
by a matrimonial lawyer to her nonclient."' Matthew S. Marrone, Million Dollar Verdict
Against NJ Lawyer for Enabling Child Abduction Sets "New Standard of Responsibility to
Nonclient, " DRI TODAY (June 9, 2011, 3:56), http://dritoday.org/post/Million-Dollar-VerdictAgainst-NJ-Lawyer-for-Enabling-Child-Abduction-Sets-New-Standard-of-Responsibility-toNonclient.aspx (quoting Walter Lesnevich, counsel and husband of Marzano-Lesnevich).
80. The court opinion quotes the agreement, in part, as follows:
Neither ... Carrascosa nor ... Innes may travel outside of the United States with
Victoria . . .without the written permission of the other party. To that end,
Victoria['s] . . . United States and Spanish passport [sic] shall be held in trust by Mitchell
A. Liebowitz, Esq. Victoria['s]. .. Spanish passport has been lost and not replaced, and
its loss was reported to the Spanish Consulate in New York ... Carrascosa [sic] will file
an application for a replacement Spanish passport within [twenty] days of today.
Innes, 87 A.3d at 780-81.
81. When informed that Carrascosa had retained the Lesnevich firm, Liebowitz wrote: "As
you may know, I am holding her daughter's United States Passport. I would prefer if you arranged
for the original file to be picked up by messenger with the messenger acknowledging receipt of the
passport." Id at 781.
82. Id. at 779. The defendants filed a third party complaint seeking contribution against
Carrascosa, Mitchell Liebowitz, and Peter Van Aulen. Both Liebowitz and Van Aulen successfully
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sued Marzano-Lesnevich and Lesnevich & Marzano-Lesnevich for
negligence and was awarded damages for emotional distress.83
When sued by Innes, Marzano-Lesnevich did not raise the litigation
privilege as a defense. Rather, her primary defense was that she owed no
duty to Innes, a non-client." It has been asserted that "[c]ases dismissing
negligence claims by parties against opposing counsel often do not rely
on absolute immunity but on the conclusion that an attorney owes no
duty to an adversary of his or her client.""s This is because
"[t]he policies supporting the denial of a duty .. . are the same as those
supporting the application of absolute immunity."" Apparently, this was
the tactic chosen by the defendants in this case. However, with
respect to the assertion that the defendants owed no duty to Innes, the
court disagreed."
In New Jersey, "the lawyer's duty of effective and vigorous
representation of his client is tempered by his corresponding duty to be
fair, candid and forthright." 8 In fact, "attorneys may owe a duty of care
to non-clients when the attorneys know, or should know, that non-clients
will rely on the attorneys' representations and the non-clients are not too
remote from the attorneys to be entitled to protection."" New Jersey
courts have also recognized that "[p]rivity between an attorney and a
non-client is not necessary for a duty to attach 'where the attorney had
reason to foresee the specific harm which occurred."o Additionally,
there may be liability to a non-client if the non-client is owed an
independent duty." In Innes, the court determined that, despite the fact
that defendants made no affirmative representation to honor the

moved for summary judgment, which was upheld on appeal. Id. at 783-84. Van Aulen did not
commit legal malpractice in his representation of Innes. Id. Liebowitz had no duty to safeguard
Victoria's passport after he was discharged by Carrascosa. Id.
83.

See Firm Representing Divorcing Wife Is Liable to Husband for Releasing Child's

Passport, 30 ABA/BNA LAW. MANUAL PROF'L CONDUCT 260, 260 (2014). Innes also filed a
criminal complaint for interference with custody against Carrascosa, who was convicted and is
currently incarcerated. Id. at 261.
84. See Innes, 87 A.3d at 784. Defendants also claimed the agreement had been repudiated by
the parties and that Marzano-Lesnevich made no representations on which Innes reasonably relied.
Id.
85. Anenson, supra note 3, at 927 n.66.
86. Id.
87. Innes, 87 A.3d at 785.
88. Davin, L.L.C. v. Daham, 746 A.2d 1034, 1046 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000).
89. Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 655 A.2d 1354, 1359-60 (N.J. 1995). New Jersey case law permits
"legal malpractice claims by nonclients." Marrone, supra note 79.
90. Estate of Albanese v. Lolio, 923 A.2d 325, 332-33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007)
(quoting Albright v. Bums, 503 A.2d 386, 389 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986)).
91. Estate of Fitzgerald v. Linnus, 765 A.2d 251, 257 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
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Carrascosa/Innes agreement, they owed a duty to Innes. 92 The opinion of
the court states: "If [defendants] were unwilling to abide by the
agreement, they were obligated to so advise Van Aulen or Liebowitz.
Simply giving the passport to Carrascosa was a breach of defendants'
duty, even if they believed in good faith that the Agreement had been
'repudiated."'
Furthermore, "it was entirely foreseeable that
Carrascosa's possession of Victoria's passport would facilitate her
ability to remove her daughter from the country" 94 -an act that was "a
'substantial factor' in bringing about the damages plaintiffs claim to
have suffered.""
IV.

APPLYING THE LITIGATION PRIVILEGE TO INNES

The defendants did not assert the litigation privilege in Innes;
rather, they unsuccessfully asserted that, since the plaintiffs were nonclients, there was no duty of care owed to them. 96 However, had the
litigation privilege been asserted as a defense or an immunity, it is
possible that the outcome of the case would have been different.
Looking at the components of the litigation privilege, there is room for
arguing its applicability to the circumstances of the Innes case.
A.

Applicable Claim

Innes' claims against Marzano-Lesnevich and her firm appear to be
within the scope of causes of action to which the litigation privilege has
been found to attach. As mentioned above, courts have extended the
litigation privilege to cover actions brought in negligence, and both the
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.97 Additionally,
some courts also include legal malpractice claims within the protection

92. Innes, 87 A.3d at 785.
93. Id. The court also considered the release of Victoria's passport to be a breach of the New
Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct ("RPC"'). Rule 1.15 of the RPC requires lawyers to
appropriately safeguard property of clients or third parties in their possession. NEW JERSEY RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.15 (N.J. SUPREME COURT 2015). As Victoria's father, Innes had a
competing claim to her passport, and "defendants were not free to dispose of the passport as they
saw fit." Innes, 87 A.3d at 786.
94. Id. at 784.
95. Id. at 790. The jury returned a verdict of $700,000 for Innes and $250,000 for Victoria.
Pre-judgment interest, counsel fees, and costs were also awarded. Id. at 779. The Superior Court of
New Jersey, Appellate Division, however, reversed the part of the judgment awarding emotional
distress damages, pre-judgment interest and counsel fees to Victoria, due to a lack of evidence, but
affirmed all aspects of the judgment that applied to Innes. Id. at 800-01.
96. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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of the privilege." Had the defendants asserted the litigation privilege,
they could have argued that the causes of action asserted by the plaintiffs
fell within its scope. Courts "have been expanding the scope of the
litigation privilege since its adoption in this country."9 9 In New Jersey,
"if an immunity applies and bars civil liability, it trumps any theory of
negligence."'o It is likely that defendants would have been successful in
meeting this aspect of this element of the privilege.
Something that might have been problematic to Marzano-Lesnevich
and her firm, however, is that, in New Jersey, "the litigation privilege
does not protect an attorney from a claim by his or her client based upon
statements the attorney made in the course of a judicial proceeding
where . .. it is alleged that the attorney breached his duty to the client by
failing to adhere to accepted standards of legal practice."'' In Innes, the
court found that Marzano-Lesnevich's act of turning over Victoria's
passport to Carrascosa breached one of the New Jersey Rules of
ProfessionalConduct ("RPC").'02 The court stated the following:
RPC 1.15(a) requires a lawyer to appropriately safeguard the property
of clients or third parties in his or her possession. RPC 1.15(b)
obligates a lawyer to promptly notify a third party of receipt of
property in which the third party has an interest. "Except as stated in
this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the
client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person
any . .. property that the client or third person is entitled to receive."
The clear import of these RPCs is that, in light of the Agreement and
Innes's competing claim to the passport as Victoria's father,
defendants were not free to dispose of the passport as they saw fit.'o3
A breach of this legal standard may have been problematic for the
defendants. Although plaintiffs were non-clients, the court found they
were owed a duty of care. 104 Furthermore, Rule 1.15(a) of the RPC
applies not only to clients, but to third parties, as well. This breach of an

98. See Richmond, supra note 1, at 296. Injurious falsehoods, deceit, and "even racketeering"
have been found to be within the scope of the privilege in some jurisdictions. Id. at 297.
99. Anenson, supra note 3, at 927.
100. Slimm, supra note 37, at 3 (restating the holding of the court in Malik v. Ruttenberg, 942
A.2d 136, 139 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008)).
101. Buchanan v. Leonard, 52 A.3d 1064, 1069 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012).
102. Innes v. Marzano-Lesnevich, 87 A.3d 775, 785-86 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014).
103. Id (citations omitted). In affirming that the defendants' motion for summary judgment
was properly denied, the court stated that "[w]hile 'a cause of action for malpractice cannot be
based exclusively on the asserted breach of' an RPC, 'it is clear that the [RPC] may be relied on as
prescribing the requisite standard of care and the scope of the attorney's duty to the client."' Id. at
785 (quoting Gilles v. Wiley 783 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001)).
104. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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accepted standard of legal practice may have been an obstacle
to the litigation privilege's applicability. With a duty of care
comes responsibilities, and breaching one of the RPC rules
by failing to safeguard property may have precluded application of the
litigation privilege.
B.

Statements and Conduct

In determining if the litigation privilege attaches to a particular
matter, courts must determine if immunity applies only to statements or
also includes conduct, and if it does not apply to conduct, the character
of that conduct. In the instant case, what caused the harm for which
Innes recovered was the act of turning Victoria's passport over to
Carrascosa.'0 o In New Jersey, an absolute privilege applies to "any
10 Whether the act of turning over Victoria's passport
communication."o
was communicative would determine the applicability of the privilege.
Arguably, all conduct imparts some interchange or message and is
communicative in its essential nature. However, even if the act is found
not to be communicative, there would be an issue as to whether this was
a non-communicative action for which an exception should be carved
out, entitling the defendants to the litigation privilege's protection.'0 o
This would be an issue for the court to determine.
C.

To Whom the PrivilegeAttaches

As initially established, the litigation privilege protected lawyers
from civil liability for statements that offended an opposing party during
litigation.' Over time, the category of individuals protected expanded
beyond just advocates.1 09 In the instant case, with the defendants being
opposing counsel and her law firm, they clearly fall within the scope of
entities entitled to the protection of the litigation privilege. Thus, there is
little doubt that the court would find that the privilege attaches to
Marzano-Lesnevich, personally, and to her firm, Lesnevich & MarzanoLesnevich, since they fall into the category of "litigants or other
participants authorized by law.""o

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
See supra note I and accompanying text.
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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Type ofProceeding

It is also likely the court would find the conduct at issue to have
occurred within a 'judicial or quasi-judicial" proceeding, enabling the
privilege to attach."' In New Jersey, "[w]hether in the process of
drafting, settlement discussions, depositions, motion practice, arguments
at trial or on appeal, the privilege . . . appl[ies]."ll 2 It extends "before,
during and after trial.""' In the instant matter, although a divorce
complaint had not yet been filed, the conduct occurred "during the
prelude to contentious matrimonial proceedings" when Carrascosa and
Innes were separated and represented by counsel.1 14 It is likely a court
wound find that this was the type of proceeding in which the privilege
would attach.
E.

Relationship to the Litigation

For the privilege to attach, the statement or conduct at issue must
have some relation to the proceedings."' Applying this liberal standard
to the instant case, this requirement would certainly be met.116 As noted
by the court: "It suffices to say that the instant litigation centered
on the October 2004 agreement . .. executed by Innes and Carrascosa

as it related to restrictions upon travel with Victoria.""' The act of
handing Victoria's passport to Carrascosa was indeed related to the
underlying litigation.
F. Achieving the Object of the Litigation
For the litigation privilege to attach, the court must find that the
conduct at issue was for the purpose of achieving a legitimate goal,
rather than for an improper purpose."' Interestingly, this element might
be difficult for the defendants to overcome but for the fact that MarzanoLesnevich's conduct was negligent rather than intentional. In the instant
case, it was not asserted that releasing Victoria's passport was done for
an illegitimate, ulterior purpose-allowing the child to be taken to Spain.
This is so even though the court determined that it was foreseeable that
release of Victoria's passport to Carrascosa would facilitate the child's
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Slimm, supra note 37, at 3.
Anenson, supra note 3, at 945.
Innes v. Marzano-Lesnevich, 87 A.3d 775, 780 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014).
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
See supranote 42 and accompanying text.
Innes, 87 A.3d at 780.
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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removal from the country."'I The law surrounding "legitimate purposes"
in the context of the litigation privilege has been described as
"unsettled"l2 0 and as "lack[ing] consistency."l 2 ' Although an illegitimate
goal was determined to be foreseeable by the defendants, it does not
follow that this equates to lack of a legitimate goal objective. Again, if
this negligent act is not subject to protection, it would hollow the
litigation privilege and its mandate.
V.

CONCLUSION

Had the defendants in Innes asserted the litigation privilege, they
may have realized more success than with the defense of lack of duty of
care. Since it was premised on a negligence claim, the underlying case
against Marzano-Lesnevich and her firm would come within the scope
of causes of action to which the litigation privilege attaches. Whether
Marzano-Lesnevich's act of turning over the passport was
communicative may have been an obstacle. However, it can be asserted
that this test is met under the premise that all conduct is in someway
communicative. And even if the communicative test is not met, in a
number of jurisdictions, those acts which have been deemed "noncommunicative" have also been protected.122 As counsel for an adverse
party, Marzano-Lesnevich and her firm clearly would have been entities
to which the privilege would attach.
Just as the Innes case appears to meet the litigation privilege's
criteria for an applicable claim, designated conduct, and protected
person status, the other aspects of the privilege also appear to be met.
The offending act-relinquishing Victoria's passport-occurred during
the prelude to contentious matrimonial proceedings, so the proceeding
would be the type to which the privilege would apply. Furthermore, the
act was related to the lawsuit and did not appear to be done for an
illegitimate, ulterior purpose, unless it would be determined that the
"litigant's purpose" test is not met since the harm done was foreseeable.
Another possible hurdle could be New Jersey's preclusion of the use of
the privilege when an attorney breaches a duty by failing to adhere to
applicable legal standards.' 23 Here, the court found breach of a
professional duty, but the act which occasioned this was itself the
119. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
120. Anenson, supra note 3, at 935.
121. Id. at 937. It has been suggested that due to recitals about "liberality" in applying the
privilege, "a more lenient connection between the method employed and the object should suffice."
Id. at 938.
122. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
123. Buchanan v. Leonard, 52 A.3d 1064, 1069 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012).
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offending negligence by Marzano-Lesnevich, so the privilege may well
have attached due to the underlying purpose of the doctrine.
In Innes, the litigation privilege was not raised as a defense or an
immunity. Had it been, some questions would have surrounded its
underlying applicability, although it might have been successful. As
Johnson and Kimmel & Silverman illustrate, one must not lose sight of
the fact that, when properly implemented, the litigation privilege
remains an important protection for lawyers from retaliatory lawsuits by
opposing parties. Because "lawyers are commonly sued by adversaries,"
the need for the privilege is "substantial."l 24 This is a protection that is
not only important for lawyers, but also important for the proper
functioning of our adversarial system.
In approaching an analysis of the litigation privilege, it is important
to remember that the litigation privilege is "as old as the law."'2 5 As a
firmly grounded common law doctrine, recent times have seen the
litigation privilege expand, ensuring that lawyers "can carry out their
ethical responsibilities on behalf of their clients without fear of
retaliatory lawsuits."' 2 6 However, there are limits to the protections of
the privilege. Although frequently described as having a broad or liberal
applicability, there are bounds within which the doctrine operates, with
its applicability being a question of law for the courts.1 27
There is little indication that the scope of the litigation privilege is
waning. Although not limitless, it offers significant protection for
lawyers, perhaps even emboldening them in their litigation tactics. It
must be remembered that the privilege was never intended to function as
a sword, but rather as a shield to protect lawyers in furthering their
legitimate litigation goals. The protected conduct of the lawyer must be
used for a purpose for which the litigation is designed. Failure to follow
this mandate could have a negative impact on the legal profession and
undermine the integrity of the adversarial system itself.

124. Richmond, supra note 1, at 284. While data about professional liability claims is lacking,
it is estimated that in the late 1970s, twenty percent of all claims filed against litigation lawyers
were by party opponents-a trend that continued in the years that followed. Anenson, supra note 3,
at 917 n.3 (citing Ronald E. Mallen & James A. Roberts, The Liability ofa Litigation Attorney to a
Party Opponent, 14 WILLAMETTE L.J. 387, 387 n.1 (1978)).
125. Anenson, supra note 3, at 919 (quoting Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 536
(1868)).
126. Schuster, supranote 4, at 39.
127. See supranote 13 and accompanying text.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2015

19

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 11

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol44/iss2/11

20

